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CHAPTER SIX 
Anglo-American merchants and stratagems 
for success in Spanish imperial markets, 
1783-1807* 
But the Spanish Colonies, being wholly cloatbed and in a great degree fed by our nation, 
should they like the tyger be suffered to cripple the band whose bounty feed them? 
Has not the second nation on the Globe in commercial tonnage, and thefust in exports 
for the necessaries of life, a right to demand with firmness, the respect due to her Flag 
and Citizens . .. 7 
When Josiah Blakeley, consul of the United States at Santiago de Cuba, wrote 
these lines to Secretary of State James Madison on November 1, 1801 he had 
recently been jailed by administrators on that island.1 This remarkable 
situation notwithstanding, his sentiments still neatly express the paradox of 
trade between the United States and Spanish Caribbean ports. The expanding 
hinterlands of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore furnished North 
American merchants with ever increasing, exportable food supplies and led 
to fierce competition for new markets at the end of the eighteenth century. 2 
At the same time, Spain's American colonies remained chronically, often 
desperately, short of food-stuffs. Imperial bureaucrats at many levels consis­
tently recognized this problem, yet they imposed numerous trade restrictions.3 
Even more than the dizzying pace of war and peace itself after 1793, these 
restrictions made North American commerce with the Spanish Caribbean 
volatile, risky and undesirable for many. 4 This essay focuses not upon those 
who were deterred from the trade, but rather upon a small network of North 
Americans who, despite the uncertainties, chose to operate within these 
markets. First, the salient characteristics of their businesses are outlined. Then, 
it is argued that their behavior departed from the models postulated for 
American merchants that have been developed by students of the period. As 
opposed to luck or 'imaginative innovation' or aggressive individualism, the 
key factor emphasized here is cultural flexibility.5 Moreover, the research is 
drawn from archives, both foreign and domestic, that are not often consulted 
by Anglo-Americanists. At the very least, this strategy allows a more correct 
identification of the individuals involved in trade with the Spanish Empire. 
The example of John Leamy provides a case in point. Countless expedientes 
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in several Spanish archives attest to his commanding presence in U.S. trade 
with Spanish America after 1792. At times when no other North American 
received the necessary licenses, Spanish imperial officials made sure that Leamy 
was able to land his cargoes. Moreover, his ships were the first foreign ones 
admitted to the Rio de la Plata in 1798.6 Yet, the most commonly consulted 
North American sources yield only the barest indications of his existence. If 
Leamy's personal or business papers have been preserved, they have yet to 
be found. But, since he was a founder and director of the Insurance Company 
of North America, it is possible to reconstruct some of his activities through 
less direct sources, such as minutes of directors' meetings and maritime 
insurance policies. While certain types of questions regarding the rate of return 
on a particular venture, for example, still cannot be answered with precision, 
these alternate sources do add new insights into entrepreneurial behavior in 
this commercial sphere. In addition to John Leamy of Philadelphia, John and 
Thomas Stoughton, based in New York, are also treated here in some detail. 
Again, Spanish archival sources attest to their importance; in this instance, 
fortunately, two sets of their letterbooks have also been preserved in New 
York. Finally, Stuart Bruchey's thorough treatment of the Olivers of Baltimore 
provides the opportunity to assess the business practices of a spectacularly 
successful firm from that port. 7 
In brief, the operations of these merchants shared the following 
characteristics: l) they were built upon personal contacts cultivated over many 
years with high-ranking peninsular officials as opposed to Spanish merchants; 
2) they preferred to rely upon relatives on the scene rather than native corre­
spondents or United States' consuls; 3) they often worked in concert with, 
instead of competing against, other North Americans from nearby ports; 4) 
they exhibited extreme flexibility in business dealings, including the willingness 
to ship provisions by indirect routes, to pay off corrupt bureaucrats, and even 
to transport slaves to gain admittance to ports that were officially closed. If 
such behavior failed to qualify as modern entrepreneurship in the fullest sense, 
it is clear nevertheless that, given the context of the Spanish commercial system, 
the Leamys, Stoughtons and Olivers acted quite rationally to maximize their 
trading opportunities. Those who acted differently simply did not succeed. 
In the forefront of Spanish imperial trade in the 1790s, these men had 
steadily nurtured Spanish contacts throughout the preceding decade. With 
Spain's overt participation in the Revolutionary War after 1779 came the 
legalization of direct trade to key Spanish Caribbean ports. This was due 
primarily to the influx of troops that needed to be fed.8 The Spanish initiated 
deals with prominent rebel merchants, offering Robert Morris one of the first 
trading licenses to Cuba. Morris jumped at this opportunity, but his principal 
contact, Juan de Miralles, soon died. Morris served as executor of the estate, 
but then turned his attention to governmental affairs and other, less fortunate 
business schemes.9 At the same time, John Leamy took his cue from the 
Spaniards, assiduously cultivating the deceased agent's secretary, Francisco 
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de Rend6n. Of Irish origin, Leamy had been educated in Spain, where he lived 
for several years prior to establishing himself in business in Philadelphia 
around 1781. Leamy had won the trust of some Spanish officials by that time, 
since he carried letters, luxury items and funds to Rend6n, who was eventually 
named the new agent. Seven years later, the highest-ranking Spanish diplomat 
in the United States, Diego de Gardoqui, admitted that Leamy performed 
favors for him, such as recruiting Pennsylvania artisans to settle in Spanish 
Louisiana.10 Likewise, the up-and-coming merchant ingratiated himself with 
Gardoqui's two subordinates, Josef de Jaudenes and Jose Ignacio Viar. 
Charged with obtaining food supplies for Santo Domingo late in 1791, these 
young Spaniards were duly impressed when Leamy diverted one of his ships, 
already loaded and destined for a French Caribbean port, to the Spanish colony 
instead. Jaudenes and Viar' noted Leamy's zeal and partiality for Spain, as 
welJ as the fact that he declined to take excessive profits from the switch. A 
few years later, Jaudenes moved into a house in Philadelphia owned by Leamy. 
And, as late as 1820, Leamy served as a clandestine conduit for privileged 
information from peninsular authorities to Spanish representatives in North 
America. Unlike the Stoughtons, then, Leamy never held the title of Spanish 
consul, but it is clear none the less that he often functioned in a similar capacity 
over the course of four decades. 11 
Like John Leamy, the Stoughtons also did favors over the years for 
Spaniards stationed in North America. For example, the son of Felipe Fatfo, 
a long-time Spanish commercial agent, owed the North Americans money 
as early as 1792.12 But if Leamy provided a residence for Jaudenes, John 
Stoughton went one step further by giving his daughter in marriage to the only 
man with authority to sell trading permits to Cuba in the early 1790s. The bride 
of Jaudenes' successor, the Marques de Casa lrujo, came from a distinguished 
Pennsylvania family, the McKeans. That tie kept him living in Philadelphia 
even after the capital had moved to Washington, D.C., no doubt a convenient 
arrangement for his business partner, James Barry. And surely it was no coinci­
dence that, following the marriage of his sister to Francisco Sarmiento, John 
Craig of Philadelphia received promising trade concessions to Venezuela.13 
Most of the persons discussed above were Roman Catholics, a fact that 
obviously facilitated these alliances. Undoubtedly, it would be difficult to · 
overstate the influence of religion in cementing official trust. For example, 
it was none other than Bishop John Carroll himself who introduced James 
Barry to Jaudenes and Viar. And the hapless Spaniard Rend6n was recalled 
to Madrid when he sought to marry the daughter of a New York merchant 
who was Protestant. Still, it must be emphasized that these North Americans 
went out of their way to pattern their behavior along Spanish, as opposed to 
strictly Catholic, lines. When Jaudenes went to drink at City Tavern, it was 
for the expressed purpose of ingratiating himself with Thomas Jefferson and 
other members of the government. Obviously, this lesson was not lost on 
another frequent patron of that establishment, John Leamy .1• 
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Cultivating the right Spanish officials was more efficient than seeking to 
establish close relations with Spanish mercantile firms. In the decade following 
the revolution, the Stoughtons sent out several feelers to houses in the peninsula 
and in the colonies. However, they do not appear to have maintained success­
ful, long-term arrangements with specific individuals or businesses. The 
difficulties involved are illustrated by the case of Pedro Juan de Erice of 
Havana. Late in 1793, the Stoughtons consigned some goods to him. A series 
of increasingly stiff letters followed, demanding more prompt unloading of 
cargoes, quicker return shipments and payment of expired accounts. Finally, 
an exasperated John Stoughton went himself on a trading voyage to the 
Spanish Caribbean. He intended to settle with Erice in person: whether or not 
he succeeded is unknown.1s John Leamy solved the problems of unreliable 
correspondents by working through his brother James, a long-term resident 
of that Cuban port. And, on at least one occasion, local Spanish functionaries 
smoothed the arrival of consignments to him.16 This last point is a telling 
one. Historians often assume that the 'latin personality' helped to keep 
Hispanic businessmen from serving as competent correspondents. In truth, 
however, it was the Spanish commercial system, defined by policymakers in 
Madrid, that really circumscribed their role. Spanish imperial merchants 
simply did not have the freedom to make decisions, the ability to guarantee 
performance, or even the access to reliable shipping information that were 
enjoyed by their North American counterparts. Leamy and the Stoughtons 
recognized this fact and consequently directed their attention towards other, 
more productive channels. 
While this circle of North American traders depended upon Bourbon 
functionaries in conducting their various commercial affairs, and even assumed 
Spanish offices themselves, they did not as a rule rely upon the services of 
American consuls stationed in Spanish colonial ports. This was an under­
standable and wise course of action. For many of the United States' consuls 
were themselves aspiring merchants who regarded official duties as secondary 
to their own business interests. Under such circumstances, it made little sense 
for them to aid competitors who already enjoyed strong influence in high 
places. More to the point, however, was the fact that the consuls were in the 
extremely unenviable position of not being legally recognized by the Spanish 
government. Thus, at the same time that the United States required them to 
protect the interests of its traders and seamen, Spain gave them little room 
to maneuver. Moreover, the consuls were often required to record formal 
protests against Spanish commercial policy, which subsequently limited their 
ability to work behind the scenes to alleviate specific problems. So, while 
stranded American sailors complained that their maintenance allowances, paid 
out of the consul's own pocket, were inadequate, local administrators harassed 
these representatives. On occasion, they had their papers confiscated, were 
asked to leave the colonies, and even were thrown into jail. Not surprisingly, 
the turn-over rate in this office was high. As a rule, then, its occupants never 
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established the powerful connections that Leamy, Craig and the Stoughtons 
had built up over the years.17 
Regarding their relationships with each other, the degree to which Leamy 
and the Stoughtons worked in concert to further their respective commercial 
ends is striking. They were never formal partners, but they did send business 
each others' way and each party performed vital services for the other. For 
example, Leamy functioned as an insurance broker, often purchasing maritime 
policies for his counterparts in New York and elsewhere. The Stoughtons, in 
turn, chartered and provisioned ships for Leamy around the time of the 
outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1793 .18 They cooperated in much 
the same way as did John Craig and the Olivers, who at least were related by 
marriage.19 In short, when Spaniards like Jaudenes presented the oppor­
tunities, Leamy and the Stoughtons responded by trusting each other to 
advance their individual interests. This occurred, it should be pointed out, 
at a time when their respective home ports, Philadelphia and New York, 
rivalled each other for national supremacy in foreign trade. 
From the examples presented above, it is obvious that success did not come 
easily to North Americans trading with the Spanish Empire. On occasion, even 
the operations of men as well-connected as Leamy and the Stoughtons did 
not proceed smoothly. When John Stoughton travelled as supercargo to Santo 
Domingo and Cuba during the summer of 1794, he carried numerous passports 
and letters of introduction to the proper authorities, each duly noting bis 
relationship to Jaudenes. Furthermore, the New Yorker's grasp of Spanish 
was strong enough to write appropriately flattering petitions to local 
dignitaries. Nevertheless, Stoughton was given the runaround, or at least 
caught in the middle of a dispute between the military commander, who wanted 
to buy flour to feed his troops, and the local economic authority, who opposed 
this. To complicate matters, the latter official had gone off on vacation on 
a remote part of Hispaniola. It took Stoughton over two weeks of difficult 
and dangerous travel through the backcouniry to track him down. With a 
smile, the official finally suggested that the cargoes be sent to Cuba. Stoughton 
had sent one of his ship captains ahead already, with instructions to deliver 
gratis one dozen bottles of mustard to the highest-ranking functionary on the 
island. Then, perceiving the market at Havana to be temporarily weak due 
to speculation and multiple arrivals from the United States, Stoughton himself 
proceeded with another ship to the smaller port of Santiago. He intended to 
sell most of the cargo there, using the proceeds to purchase sugar, hides and 
brandy of higher quality and lower price than were available in Havana. 
However, he was not allowed to sell much flour there and ultimately sailed 
for th� capital anyway. This particular letterbook ended with notices to his 
partners that Stoughton would winter in Havana, and tbat the venture would 
probably not live up to expectations after all.20 
If John Stoughton had to endure such costly delays, they were undoubtedly 
even more common for other North American traders. For example, some 
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twenty-two U.S. ships were suddenly embargoed in Havana harbor in June 
1797, for reasons connected with military security. By the third week in port, 
the captains estimated that they had collectively lost over sixteen thousand 
dollars. Major expenses included: seamen's wages, provisions, and medical 
fees; damages to vessels caused by worms and unrepaired leaks; and spoiled 
cargoes. Moreover, they complained that ships already loaded with sugar for 
the return voyage would not arrive home in time to avoid an increased rate 
of duties on that item.21 This case is but one example of how costly disrup­
tions of commerce could not always be blamed on cruisers and pirates. Again, 
it was Spanish imperial policy that caused uncertainty, risk and loss for North 
American merchants. And, for most of the years under consideration here, 
direct trade with the colonies had been strictly prohibited. Under those 
circumstances, Leamy, the Stoughtons and the Olivers had to endure the 
inconveniences of indirect shipping - via New Orleans or to a nearby French 
island where trade with both the United States and Spanish colonies was 
permitted. Alternately, traders could misrepresent their true destinations on 
official documents or entrust their cargoes to smugglers. 22 Leamy and the 
Stoughtons accepted these conditions, but in an era when other markets ex­
isted, those who found the conditions distasteful simply turned elsewhere. 
In fact, there was one aspect of trade with the Spanish Empire that for some 
North Americans was clearly unacceptable, even though it facilitated entrance 
to Spanish colonial ports. For years, foreign merchants transporting slaves 
were allowed to sell a proportionate number of barrels of flour at substantial 
rates of profit. This policy was extended to Cuba, desperately short of labor, 
in 1789. Throughout the next fifteen years, blacks were delivered to that island 
regularly; by far the majority of ships involved were identified as Anglo­
American. 23 While many of the slaves had probably been picked up on 
adjacent Caribbean islands, at least some were transported directly from the 
African coast. Furthermore, although such evidence is sketchy, there was at 
least one recorded instance of a black from Maryland being sold into slavery 
in Havana.24 More research needs to be done, but at this stage it is clear 
that most of the aforementioned merchants engaged in this activity. The 
Stoughtons, clearly, did. Moreover, they worried about obtaining insurance 
for ships carrying human cargoes.25 How the majority of their peers reacted 
to their involvement in the slave trade is unknown. However, it is interesting 
to compare the operations of men like Leamy with those of others less success­
ful or less visible in the Spanish Caribbean trade. Thanks to Jules Boymel's 
unpublished analysis of the rich Boone Papers at the Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania, it is possible to use the career of Jeremiah Boone as an 
example.26 Coincidentally, Boone arrived in Philadelphia the same year that 
John Leamy did; from 1781 on, both worked to build up their respective 
businesses. Yet, while Leamy cultivated contacts in the manner described 
above, Boone seems merely to have dispatched his ships to various Spanish 
and non-Spanish ports in the Caribbean. His son, William, occasionally 
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travelled as supercargo to Havana. While there, the younger Boone com­
plained strongly about official corruption. Contrast this attitude with John 
Stoughton's, as he methodically sought to smooth his own way. And, given 
the fact that Jeremiah Boone was a Quaker who once wrote an anti-slavery 
tract, it is unlikely that he used slaves to gain entrance to colonial ports. In 
short, Boone was unwilling to behave in the manner best calculated to insure 
high returns from Spanish imperial trade. Not surprisingly, his businesses 
failed three times. While these losses corresponded with the terminations of 
three wars, the evidence indicates that, even in the good years, he never enjoyed 
Leamy's and the Stoughtons' strong links to Spanish markets. 
To conclude, we cannot fully understand trade between the United States 
and the Spanish Empire in the 1790s simply by focusing upon traditional 
market mechanisms. For, in general, demand in the Spanish Caribbean for 
North American products was high, at the same time that east coast merchants 
needed Mexican specie to trade with other parts of the world.27 Given the 
geographical proximity, these areas should have been prime trading partners. 
However, constraints imposed upon foreign merchants by Spanish imperial 
policy obscured this relationship and molded entrepreneurial behavior along 
distinctive, sometimes contradictory lines. Leamy and his counterparts were 
often forced to act in ways reminiscent of seventeenth-century traders. Their 
methods were highly personalized; they relied upon relatives and patrons at 
the start of a century that saw the rise of the independent, less kin-oriented 
entrepreneur.28 At the same time, they were modern men, whose behavior 
was eminently rational and, in some instances, pioneering. Both Leamy and 
John Craig were original subscribers to and directors of the Insurance 
Company of North America, founded in 1792. Leamy also had the distinction 
of being that agency's best customer during its first years; in so doing, he 
showed himself to be a risk-taker who took some of the risk out of his own 
operations.29 Perhaps his greatest talent was his ability and willingness to act 
like a 'Spaniard' when circumstances so warranted, and like an 'Anglo­
American' when the opportunity was there. Of such was successful entre­
preneurship made in the Napoleonic era. 
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